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Golden aGes and renaissanCes
Merry Wiesner-Hanks
A
s an early modernist in a sea of medievalists (and where but 
at Kalamazoo could one use that phrase?) I would like to 
focus my brief remarks today on Sue’s contributions to a 
basic, and yet surprisingly feminist, historical task: periodization. 
I realize in doing this that I am undertaking a very old fashioned 
sort of women’s history—the “contribution” school—but we are 
here to honor and celebrate Sue, so this is fitting. 
As most of you know, Sue joined the editorial team 
of Becoming Visible: Women in European History on its second 
edition, in 1987. Both this edition and the first edition, which 
had appeared a decade earlier, included Joan Kelly’s path-breaking 
article, “Did Women have a Renaissance?” Kelly’s essay led 
historians of women in many fields to question the applicability 
of chronological categories derived from male experience.1 We 
asked whether women had an Athenian Golden Age, an Age of 
Jacksonian Democracy, an Enlightenment, a frontier. Thirty 
years later, the questioning continues, augmented by doubts about 
whether chronological categories derived from the experience of 
some women can be applied to women’s history as a whole, or 
whether change that is generally seen as only tangential to gender 
relations should qualify as a major turning point. Such doubts 
arise in part from questions about “women” as an ontological 
category, and the close attention paid to multiple axes of 
difference in women’s and gender history. 
These doubts have led some historians to stress 
continuities rather than ruptures. In their survey of European 
women’s history, A History of Their Own, for example, Bonnie 
Anderson and Judith Zinsser discuss peasant women from the 
ninth century to the twentieth in a single section. Judith Bennett 
has long advocated questioning the “master narrative of a great 
transformation in women’s lives between 1300 and 1700.” She has 
recently broadened her focus and called for an emphasis on long-
term continuities, particularly what she terms the “patriarchal 
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equilibrium,” across all periods, not simply across “the great 
divide” of 1500.
But is something lost, if in their sensitivity to differences 
among women (and perhaps their desire to make women’s history 
less depressing), feminist historians refuse to apply structures 
of periodization? If a primary (some would say the primary) 
contribution of historians to the scholarly and larger worlds is the 
analysis of change over time, what happens if women’s and gender 
historians step back from this task? Does this make women’s and 
gender history “motionless,” a word used by the French Annales-
school historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie to describe European 
history over the longue durée stretching from the eleventh century 
to the nineteenth, in an article that appeared the same year that 
the first edition of Becoming Visible did?
I would (and do) argue that it does, and in this Sue’s work 
has been essential in shaping my ideas. In “Fashion’s Captives: 
Medieval Women in French Historiography,” now more than 
twenty years old, Sue pointed out that in some Annales school 
works—a historical school Natalie Davis has termed a “sodality 
of French brothers”—women are, in fact, the perfect example 
of motionless history. They are viewed primarily as part of a 
household, serving as a means of exchange between families. She 
notes: “By such formulations gender for women, if not for men, 
was assumed to be a historical constant, not a dynamic category 
that changed in Europe’s formative centuries and changed again 
with the transition into modern times.” This critique is similar 
to that voiced more recently by feminist historians of India such 
as Tanika Sarkar and Kamela Visweswaran, who take Subaltern 
Studies and much of post-colonial scholarship to task for viewing 
actual women largely as a type of “eternal feminine,” victimized 
and abject, an essentialism that denies women agency and turns 
gender into a historical constant, not a dynamic category. I am 
not sure if Sarkar and Visweswaran have read Sue’s work, but 
they should.3 
 Criticizing periodization or its absence has thus been an 
important part of women’s and gender history, but critique will 
only take us so far. Along with demolishing or disassembling the 
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chronological structures that have given history shape, we also 
need to build new structures of periodization that take gender 
into account from the start and not simply stir it in later. In 
this we have some not very good examples, including Lawrence 
Stone’s idea about the change from “open lineage” to a “restricted 
patriarchal nuclear family” to a “closed domestic nuclear family,” 
and Thomas Laqueur’s notion of a change from a “one sex” 
to a “two sex” model of gender differentiation.4 Stone’s idea 
has been rejected as overly simplistic, but Laqueur’s remains 
influential, though more so among non-specialists than among 
people who actually know something about the history of science 
and medicine, who have rejected it as far too dichotomous and 
teleological.5 (I don’t need to tell you how important medieval 
historians have been in this critique.)
 But we also have a very good model. In her essay “The 
Dominion of Gender, or How Women Fared in the High Middle 
Ages,” first published in the second edition of Becoming Visible 
and then revised for the third, Sue describes the centuries from 
the eleventh to the fourteenth as a time when “gender became 
an increasingly inflexible category for organizing thoughts about 
society” in which notions of polarity between woman and man 
were first used by theologians “to explain to themselves why 
the creation of man alone was not enough in God’s benevolent 
scheme.” These notions gradually became “generally accepted 
commonplaces,” and shaped the more complex political and 
commercial institutions developing in Europe at this point. This 
group knows very well that Sue has not been alone in asserting 
the importance of the restructuring of the gender system in the 
High Middle Ages, for many others who provided support for 
this argument (as well as revisions, modifications, and nuancing) 
are here, or their spirits are hovering over the room. But Sue 
links this directly to issues of periodization, noting: “The loss 
of rights accompanying the triumph of a rigid polar construct 
of gender constituted an important transition for women, and it 
forced substantial changes in their lives. Certainly for women this 
era represented as great a change as the Renaissance represented 
for men later. Women lost ground in the increasingly complex 
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institutions that could enforce a rigid code of gender and in the 
commercial centers where authority over resources concentrated 
into fewer, largely male, hands.” Women’s experience bears 
earlier and clearer witness than does the experience of men to 
the West’s transformation into a complex civilization during the 
medieval centuries.
These few sentences pack in five primary points: 1. the 
history of women does have periods of significant change 2. these 
are different than those for men 3. these are related to those for 
men. 4. these are not the same for all women 5. these intersect 
with other transformations. I can’t think of how one could 
formulate the insights of feminist periodization more concisely 
than Sue does, though I’ve certainly seen them formulated more 
long-windedly. 
The stress on difference and diversity among women, 
and the more explicit focus on gender, has made the task of 
periodization harder, no matter what era we study. We no 
longer look for a golden age for women, judging periods by 
whether “women’s status” rose or fell in them. (A friend of mine 
wonderfully calls this the Glinda-test, from the scene in the 
Wizard of Oz when Glinda asks Dorothy whether she is a good 
witch or a bad witch. In earlier Glinda tests, classical Athens, 
the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment were bad witches, while 
the Iron Age and the Merovingians were good witches.) We 
don’t assume there are single points of transformation, when, 
for example, medieval became modern. (Or at least I don’t read 
arguments about whether Hildegard of Bingen or Margery Kempe 
or Margaret Fell Fox was the first modern woman, the way I 
used to read arguments about whether Dante or Luther or Oliver 
Cromwell was the first modern man.) 
Even though periodization is now more complicated, 
we can still use Sue’s five-point schema to help us think about 
change—and continuity—over time. This task is particularly 
important for us as feminists interested in the premodern period. 
First, it might help sway the remaining troglodytes who doubt 
the centrality of gender as an essential category in history. More 
importantly, it might convince our students and colleagues—
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many of them in gender and women’s studies programs—that 
interesting things did happen in the distant past (that is, before 
the invention of television). We need to spread the word
—and in this I agree with Judith Bennett rather than disagree 
with her—that differences created by time are just as dynamic, 
problematic, and fascinating as those created by any other axis 
of difference—and what better way to do this than to engage in 
vigorous debates about what times mattered, and why?
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
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